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Since decades, economists and policy makers recognise that the market pro-
vides too little incentives for ¯rms to invest in research and development
(R&D). Imperfect appropriability, uncertain outcomes and large sunk set-up
costs are examples of factors that characterise R&D activities and drive a
wedge between private and social bene¯ts of R&D, and thus between pri-
vate and social incentives to invest in R&D. One of the instruments that
economists and policy makers have devised and used to tighten this gap,
next to e.g. the patent system and subsidy policy, is the stimulation of for-
mation of research joint ventures (RJVs) or other cooperative agreements
related to R&D between otherwise competing ¯rms. Indeed, anti-trust leg-
islation of Western countries has provided an exception for such agreements
given the potential social bene¯ts.
In the industrial organisation (IO) literature much attention has been
paid to the identi¯cation of circumstances under which R&D cooperation
is actually welfare-improving compared to R&D competition and ¯rms have
incentives to enter cooperative agreements. It is e.g. generally accepted that
one of the important conditions for cooperation to be welfare-enhancing is
the existence of important knowledge spillovers between ¯rms. This and
other conclusions are made on the basis of relatively simple game-theoretic
models of ¯rms in oligopoly. Empirical and especially experimental tests of
assumptions and/or predictions of the theoretical models are still exceptions,
although catching-up on this ground has been very recently set in.
The main aim of this paper is to give the reader an idea of the large gap
between the overwhelming theoretical IO literature on the topic of R&D co-
operation and spillovers and the scarce empirical and experimental evidence
motivated by this theory. Furthermore, suggestions for experimental research
are put forward that extend or improve the related theory.
In chapter 1 an extensive overview of IO models that deal with R&D co-
operation, after having situated these models in the more general theoretical
R&D literature, is provided. Chapter 2 surveys empirical (non-experimental)
analyses of R&D cooperation and spillovers motivated by theory, which
3mainly consist of econometric analyses. This chapter does not survey the
more extensive empirical literature on R&D cooperation and RJV formation
in general, but rather focuses on research related to the link with spillovers.
In chapter 3 we give an overview of past laboratory research on R&D and
related games. Here we adopt a broader approach since strategic interactions
in experiments on R&D and R&D cooperation are much related to interac-
tions in oligopoly experiments on quantity or price decisions and collusion,
and to interactions in public goods/bads games.
4Chapter 1
IO models of R&D cooperation
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter an overview is given of the mainstream theoretical IO litera-
ture on cooperative R&D behaviour of ¯rms. In contrast to the transaction
cost and strategic management literature, where scholars are traditionally
more concerned about the internal organisation of ¯rms1, the (recent) IO
literature concentrates on strategic interactions among ¯rms mainly by ap-
plying a game-theoretic approach, and on the e®ects of ¯rms' actions on
variables as industrial structure, pro¯t and welfare. A framework of multi-
ple decision stages, with at least an R&D stage and a pricing or production
stage, has become a widespread approach to model R&D decisions of ¯rms
and especially to examine issues of R&D cooperation.
Before turning to an overview of the cooperative R&D literature, we
situate this type of models in the general IO literature on R&D in section
1.2. In sections 1.3 and 1.4 overviews are given of basic models with cost-
reducing R&D and other types of R&D respectively. Section 1.5 gives an
overview of important issues that are not (thoroughly) treated in the basic
models. As is very common in this literature, it is mostly assumed that
¯rms remain competitors in the ¯nal goods market, irrespective of whether
they cooperate in R&D, or more general, how they behave before entering
the ¯nal goods market. Section 1.6 gives an overview of the few papers
that investigate the hypothesis|somewhat related to multimarket contact
hypotheses2| that cooperation in the R&D market can enhance cooperation
1For overviews of the strategic management and transaction cost literature on R&D
cooperation we refer to Hagedoorn et al. (2000), Alm and McKelvey (2000) and Calaghirou
et al. (2003).
2We refer to Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and Matsushima (2001) for theoretical
analyses of the link between multimarket contact and collusion in the ¯nal goods market.
5in the ¯nal goods market. Section 1.7 concludes the chapter.
1.2 IO models of R&D: a general overview
Initially, oligopoly models of R&D were mainly set up to investigate Schum-
peterian hypotheses that R&D and innovative activities are very much re-
lated to market structure and that innovative ¯rms have some form of market
power. As such, in the elder literature much attention has been paid to the
relation between innovation(s) and (the evolution of) market structure. We
distinguish two basic modeling approaches that have served for this and other
analyses, i.e. tournament and non-tournament modeling.
A basic feature of tournament models is that the ¯rst ¯rm that succeeds
in innovating ends up to be the innovator which mostly comes down to win-
ning a (patent) race. As such, in most of these models the timing of an
innovation plays a central role in the sense that it is important to be the ¯rst
to innovate (or to get a patent). Tournament models have been mainly but
not solely used to investigate the above mentioned issues of market structure
and market power. Gradually, as the literature began to focus more on R&D
cooperation, especially after the publication of the paper of d'Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988), non-tournament models were more and more turned to.
Indeed, R&D cooperation is mostly dealt with in the context of a non-
tournament model where ¯rms are not engaged in a race but can all succeed
at the same time in `producing innovations'. A tournament setting may be
associated with the existence of only one R&D path for ¯rms to ¯nally end
up with an innovation while in a non-tournament setting several R&D paths,
that are either closely related or not, may drive a ¯rm towards innovating.
In what follows we present an overview of non-cooperative R&D models
and distinguish between tournament and non-tournament settings without
claiming that this is the ultimate way of structuring the extended strand of
literature3.
1.2.1 Tournament models
Among tournament models with timing we ¯nd deterministic races, where a
deterministic relationship between R&D investment and the time needed to
produce a practically relevant innovation is assumed, and stochastic races,
3Another option would be to add a category with `grey zone' models that contain
characteristics of both tournament and non-tournament settings.
6where the relationship is stochastic4. In a deterministic race, the ¯rm with
the largest R&D investment today wins the race.
The very ¯rst contributions that contain equilibrium models based on
single-stage stochastic patent races are Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde (1980)
and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980b)5. Typically, the probability of winning
the race depends on the R&D investment of a ¯rm at a certain point in time.
The model of Loury (1979) has ¯xed R&D costs while Lee and Wilde (1980)
assume that part of R&D costs is variable and dropped as soon as a successful
innovation is implemented. This di®erence in assumptions on costs of R&D
investment yields opposing conclusions regarding the e®ect of rivalry in the
product market on pro¯t-maximising R&D expenditures. If R&D investment
mainly consists of ¯xed (variable) costs, rivalry in the product market would
reduce (enhance) R&D. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980b) provide an analysis
based on a deterministic race.
The stochastic as well as the deterministic models predict that ¯rms over-
invest in R&D compared to what is socially optimal, given a ¯xed market
structure. Welfare analyses suggest that, when entry to the market is not
costless, perfect competition is not the socially optimal market structure but
rather some form of imperfect competition.
A tournament setting is not necessarily based on issues of timing of in-
novation but can naturally result from other model characteristics. E.g. in
Futia (1980) and Rogerson (1982), the innovator is randomly chosen with
the probability of becoming the innovator depending on the amount of R&D
undertaken. Overinvestment in R&D is also predicted by these models. Fur-
thermore, Sah and Stiglitz (1987) posit a stochastic relationship between
R&D e®ort and ¯nal innovations (instead of becoming the innovator). Firms
are allowed to engage in more than one R&D project and the market is char-
acterised by Bertrand competition. The model is of a tournament kind since
a ¯rm only gets a rent if she is the only successful innovator, as all pro¯ts are
`Bertrand-competed' away when several ¯rms turn out to be successful. The
model predicts that many asymmetric Nash equilibria exist and that ¯rms'
R&D expenditures are una®ected by market structure. Another result that
contrasts with ¯ndings of models with timing is that market expenditures on
R&D are less than socially optimal.
The racing models with timing have been extended or adjusted on several
4For an extended overview of the literature on timing of innovation we refer to Rein-
ganum (1989). She uses the terms \deterministic auction models" and \stochastic racing
models".
5These contributions should be seen as extensions of models examining the e®ect of
exogenous market structure on innovation. For overviews we refer to Kamien and Schwartz
(1975) and Loury (1979).
7grounds. First, there is the issue of appropriability. In the original contri-
butions it was assumed that patent protection was complete while `newer'
models allow for imperfect patent protection. In Stewart (1983) a unique
value of a winner's share in total industry pro¯t exists that maximises prof-
its and that leads to a choice of R&D strategies by the other ¯rms similar to
strategies cooperating ¯rms would choose. Increased competition would lead
to a fall in the ¯rm's R&D investment as long as spillovers are too high and
the winning ¯rm thus receives a lower pro¯t from it's innovation than the
pro¯t she would receive under the optimising share parameter. Mortensen
(1982) comes to a similar conclusion in a tournament framework without tim-
ing. The main conclusion of Reinganum (1982), who assumes that the ¯rms
that are not the ¯rst to innovate still receive a positive payo®, is that when
patent protection is ine®ective, ¯rms do not have incentives to invest in R&D.
Clearly, when taking into account issues of appropriability, overinvestment
in R&D does not occur.
Instead of assuming symmetry among all ¯rms in an industry, some mod-
els have started from a market with one incumbent ¯rm and several potential
entrants. The main interest now goes to ¯rms' incentives to engage in innova-
tive activities rather then to how market structure and innovative activities
are related. Reinganum (1983) and Reinganum (1985) provide models with
one ¯rm and one possible innovation and several ¯rms and a sequence of
innovations respectively. The latter model is a multi-stage model where all
pro¯ts accrue to an innovator only as long as nothing new is invented. As
elaborated on by Reinganum (1989), this `incumbent-versus-challenger(s)'
set-up yields di®erences in R&D incentives between both types of ¯rms. The
main ¯nding is that in a Nash equilibrium, the incumbent monopolist invests
less in R&D than the outside `challengers' as he anticipates future (drastic)
innovations of the challenger(s) that reduce the present value of his prof-
its. This is in contrast to ¯ndings from deterministic race models, such as
e.g. Gilbert and Newberry (1982), where the incumbent comes out to be the
largest R&D spender and thus persists as a monopolist6.
Another application of asymmetries among ¯rms is to let the probability
of winning the patent race depend on accumulated knowledge by interpreting
an R&D project as a multi-stage game where the winner is the ¯rst ¯rm that
completes all stages. Examples of models where ¯rms proceed to further
stages in a deterministic way are Fudenberg et al. (1983)7 and Harris and
6According to Reinganum (1989) both type of models are not mutually exclusive.
Stochastic races would be better suited to model uncertain basic research, while deter-
ministic races more apply to development and new product introduction.
7In Grishagin et al. (2001), a patent race similar to Fudenberg et al. (1983), is considered
where ¯rms do not know their relative position during the race.
8Vickers (1985). In Grossman and Shapiro (1987) the time before entering
a following stage is stochastic while in Harris and Vickers (1987) there is a
stochastic relationship between the amount of R&D and winning a stage. A
general result is that a typical response for a ¯rm having success in the ¯rst
stage(s) is an increase in R&D e®ort of the leading ¯rm and a decrease for
the lagging ¯rm. If ¯rms' accumulated knowledge is su±ciently close, i.e.
if the ¯rms remain tied, they will choose to invest in R&D at a high rate.
Results of the deterministic models are even stronger since if one ¯rm is only
slightly ahead, the other simply drops out of the race.
A recent further improvement by Doraszelski (2003) to capture knowledge
accumulation in a dynamic R&D race yielded other conclusions. In his model,
the distribution of success times depends on current R&D expenditures and
the accumulated (depreciated) knowledge stock. Simulations yield that pure
knowledge gathering dominates strategic considerations as R&D incentives
decline with an increase in the knowledge stock. Consequently, the ¯rm that
lags behind, and thus has a relatively low knowledge stock, may invest more
in R&D than the leader who has a large knowledge stock. As such, lagging
¯rms not necessarily drop out of the race but may be engaged in catching-up.
1.2.2 Non-tournament models
As already mentioned, most theoretical contributions on R&D cooperation
are of a non-tournament kind where several ¯rms can have successful R&D
projects at the same time. On the other hand, (recent) non-tournament R&D
models also concentrate mostly on comparing modes where ¯rms cooperate in
R&D with more competitive modes. The emergence of (predominantly non-
tournament) models on R&D cooperation is closely connected to the general
recognition of knowledge spillovers. Due to public good characteristics of
R&D, ¯rms cannot always reap all bene¯ts of their R&D. R&D cooperation
would then be a natural candidate to solve this problem by internalising the
spillovers.
As mentioned before, in the beginning of the eighties much attention
went to the relation between innovation and market structure. On the basis
of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a), where symmetric ¯rms choose R&D and
output simultaneously, similar conclusions as in 1.2.1 regarding some form of
imperfect competition being the socially optimal market structure are made.
Brander and Spencer (1983) argued that in a simultaneous single-stage game
with cost-reducing R&D an implicit assumption is that the exclusive aim
of R&D investment is to reduce marginal production cost. They raised the
issue that ¯rms most likely have also more strategic considerations, such as
gaining market share, and take decisions that are to be made in the product
9market into account when they invest in R&D. If this is the case, R&D
should be modelled in a two-stage game. In a ¯rst stage, the R&D decision
is simultaneously made by all ¯rms, and in a second stage, output or price
levels are chosen. If it is assumed that ¯rms are rational, the solution concept
of the game is SPN (SPN) equilibrium and the appropriate solution method
is backward induction. This approach is mostly used in non-tournament
models of R&D.
Within this strategic setting one can also distinguish between determin-
istic and stochastic models. In deterministic models R&D investment auto-
matically yields an innovation while in stochastic models (see e.g. Reynolds
and Isaac, 1992; Choi, 1993; Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998) a stochastic rela-
tion is assumed between R&D e®ort and outcome8. Decisions in the R&D
stage a®ect either unit production cost (see e.g. Katz, 1986; d'Aspremont
and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992) or product quality (Motta, 1992)
and are usually characterised by knowledge spillovers that result in costless
advantages for the competitor.
The analysis of Spence (1984) is one of the ¯rst to formally take into
account the issues of knowledge spillovers and R&D subsidies in a strategic
R&D model with n ¯rms. In his paper unit production cost is a declining
function of the knowledge stock of a ¯rm, which grows with current R&D
expenditures and spilt over R&D expenditures of other ¯rms. He does not
explicitly model the product market but assumes that at any point in time
an equilibrium in quantities exists. It is found that R&D incentives decrease
as appropriability is lower (or spillovers higher) and as concentration declines
(given low appropriability). Therefore, according to the author, government
should subsidise R&D, especially when spillovers are high. Moreover, welfare
is highest in markets with high spillovers and appropriate subsidies. Further,
it is also suggested that cooperative R&D may be suitable to raise welfare.
A non-strategic model where the e®ects of spillovers are included is Levin
and Reiss (1988). Firms simultaneously decide on cost-reducing process and
quality-enhancing product R&D and on production quantity. The main con-
clusion is that when taking into account spillovers from process R&D to
product R&D or vice versa, higher spillovers not necessarily reduce R&D
incentives.
Most strategic R&D models speci¯cally deal with R&D cooperation and
8In this context we refer to the earlier mentioned `grey zone'. Stochastic non-
tournament models have some characteristics of tournament models, since they allow for
the possibility of only one ¯rm ending up with an innovation. Sah and Stiglitz (1987),
though, is an example of a model with a stochastic relation between R&D and innovation
that can be considered as a tournament model because of the way the product market is
modelled (see 1.2.1).
10these models are discussed in the following sections. Non-cooperative models
in a non-tournament setting usually focus on asymmetric situations where
one ¯rm has an advantage over the other. In Poyago-Theotoky (1996) e.g.,
¯rms in duopoly that have di®erent initial unit production costs, simultane-
ously make R&D decisions in a ¯rst stage and quantity decisions in a second
stage. She ¯nds that depending on the choice of cost function the low- or
high-cost ¯rm spends more on R&D. When an additive cost function is used
the low-cost ¯rm spends more due to an incentive e®ect. With a multiplica-
tive cost function the high-cost ¯rm spends more because of the emergence
of an e®ectiveness e®ect.
Some authors have also looked at another form of asymmetry, namely
a sequential equilibrium where ¯rms start with leader/follower roles that
result e.g. from a pre-development race. In Bondt et al. (1992) symmetric
¯rms that sell di®erentiated goods play a sequential game while in De Bondt
and Henriques (1995) and Amir et al. (2000) ¯rms start with di®erent initial
unit production costs and/or spillovers. De Bondt and Henriques (1995) ¯nd
that the ¯rm that is good (bad) at absorbing information9 ends up to be
the leader (follower) of the R&D game. This leading ¯rm is not necessarily
the one that started with lower production costs or higher R&D e±ciency.
A similar result is found in Amir et al. (2000). Moreover, depending on
the ratios of spillover rate to demand cross-slope, the endogenous emerging
sequential solution yields higher pro¯ts for both ¯rms and higher welfare
than the simultaneous solution.
Joshi and Vonortas (1996) view the R&D process as a two-stage process
where technological knowledge is generated from basic research through a
knowledge production function in a ¯rst stage and this knowledge is trans-
formed into unit cost reductions in a second stage10. Di®erent parameteri-
sations of the knowledge production function and the unit cost function are
compared and the authors conclude that the reaction of optimal R&D expen-
ditures to changes in initial knowledge stock and own and rival's spillovers
rates depends on (a) the elasticity of output with respect to R&D; (b) the
elasticity of knowledge with respect to R&D and (c) the degree of convexity
of the unit cost function.
9A higher absorptive capacity implies that incoming spillovers are higher than outgoing
spillovers.
10See also 1.5.6.
111.3 Basic models of R&D cooperation with
cost-reducing R&D
In what is by far the largest part of the literature on cooperative R&D
games, R&D is de¯ned as cost-reducing. This is often interpreted as R&D
being process R&D. In most of these models, knowledge spillovers enter the
model and e®ective R&D of a ¯rm is de¯ned as the sum of its own R&D
and R&D spilled over from other ¯rms in the industry, where the spilled over
part is never larger than the R&D carried out by the ¯rm itself11.
As mentioned before, most models are two-stage models where perfectly
informed ¯rms simultaneously decide how much to invest in R&D in a ¯rst
stage and on prices or production quantities in a second stage. In a ¯rst
stage ¯rms either play a non-cooperative R&D game or a cooperative R&D
game. In the cooperative game it is standard to assume that the ¯rms can
credibly commit to the cooperative R&D level which is the level of R&D
that maximises total industry pro¯t12. The equilibrium concept of the non-
cooperative game is the SPN equilibrium.
In general, the pro¯t function of ¯rm i in an industry with n ¯rms engaged
in Cournot competition is de¯ned as follows
¼i = piqi ¡ ci(Xi)qi ¡ gi(xi);
where pi is the inverse demand function of ¯rm i13, ci(Xi) the unit cost
function with Xi = xi + ¯
Pn
j6=i xj representing e®ective R&D of ¯rm i and
gi(xi) the R&D cost function with xi representing R&D investment of ¯rm
i. ¯ is the spillover parameter.
The model is solved by backward induction. In the second stage ¼i is
maximized with respect to qi for all i, which yields a ¯rst-stage pro¯t function
in terms of the R&D investment of ¯rm i and the other ¯rms in the industry.
In a scenario without R&D cooperation, the ¯rst-stage pro¯t function of ¯rm
i is maximized with respect to xi, yielding a symmetric equilibrium prediction
for xi. In a scenario with R&D cooperation, on the other hand, total industry
pro¯t is maximized with respect to xi, yielding a cooperative outcome for
xi which is usually assumed to be symmetric across the industry. Most
of the literature focuses on comparisons between R&D predictions, welfare,
industry pro¯t, etc. in non-cooperative and cooperative R&D scenarios.
11As noted by Bondt (1996), the earliest formal oligopoly model with spillovers can be
found in a paper of Ru® (1969).
12In Battaggion and Garella (2001) di®erent scenarios of R&D cooperation are examined
in a model with unveri¯able R&D e®orts.
13In the case of Bertrand (price) competition in the second stage, the demand function
would be qi.
12A model that has received much attention in the game-theoretic R&D
literature and has stimulated further research on the topic is in the paper
of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990)14. In the model the industry
is a duopoly with Cournot-competing ¯rms, homogenous goods and a linear
demand function. Decision variables in the ¯rst stage are unit production
cost reductions and spillovers are thus output spillovers. A quadratic R&D
cost function is introduced as to guarantee diminishing returns to own R&D,
although this does not guarantee that returns to e®ective R&D are also




2 . Findings are that R&D cooperation only enhances R&D investment and
welfare when spillovers are large enough and that ¯rms always underinvest
in R&D compared to the welfare-maximising solution.
A two-stage model where the ¯rst-stage decision variable is R&D in-
vestment and spillovers are input spillovers is developed by Kamien et al.
(1992)15. The industry consists of n ¸ 2 ¯rms that produce di®erentiated
products and are either engaged in Cournot or Bertrand competition in the
second stage. Demand is linear and unit cost consists of a constant part
minus `R&D production', where the R&D production function is concave in
e®ective R&D. In their model, ci(Xi) = c ¡ fi(Xi) where fi(Xi) is twice
di®erentiable and concave in Xi, fi(0) = 0, fi(Xi) · c and f0
i(Xi) > 0, and
gi(xi) = xi. Four possible organisation types, i.e. R&D competition, R&D
cartelisation, RJV (research joint venture) competition and RJV cartelisa-
tion are compared. The ¯rst mode, R&D competition, implies that each
¯rm individually decides how much to invest in R&D as to maximise in-
dividual pro¯t, while R&D cartelisation implies that ¯rms coordinate their
R&D activities in order to maximise the sum of their pro¯ts. In the case of
RJV competition ¯rms also operate individually and spillovers are complete,
while the forming of RJV cartels implies coordination of ¯rms' R&D deci-
sions and complete spillovers. In other words, if ¯rms form an RJV, they
fully share information about their R&D activities. Findings are that RJV
cartelisation is the most desirable type of organisation, as prices are lowest
and technological improvement highest. On the other hand, RJV compe-
tition yields highest product prices. This means that only if ¯rms form a
cartel, they should be encouraged to coordinate their R&D activities and
form an RJV.
In the same tradition Suzumura (1992) sets up a model with general
demand and cost functions with ¯rms producing a homogenous good and
competing in quantities in the second stage. It is found that in the presence
14Henceforth AJ.
15Henceforth KMZ.
13of large spillovers, there is always underinvestment in R&D compared to
the socially optimal level. Cooperative R&D investment is closer to welfare-
optimising R&D than non-cooperative investment though. In the absence
of spillovers the level of R&D in the non-cooperative equilibrium may over-
shoot the socially optimal level, when the number of ¯rms in the industry is
relatively large and demand is concave.
A general ¯nding of the above models is that when spillovers are small,
i.e. below a certain threshold, R&D investment and social welfare are higher
when ¯rms choose their R&D non-cooperatively compared to when they
choose their R&D as to maximise total industry pro¯t. For spillover lev-
els that are above the threshold the opposite is valid. In that case R&D
investment and welfare are higher under R&D cooperation than under R&D
competition. These conclusions are based on the assumption that ¯rms com-
pete in prices or quantities in the second stage. Collusion in both stages of
the game yields lower welfare than R&D cooperation combined with price
or quantity competition. These results are often interpreted as a rationale
for government to allow and even stimulate the formation of RJVs in indus-
tries characterised by large knowledge spillovers. Furthermore, they suggest
leniency in anti-trust policies towards R&D cooperation provided that the
cooperation does not extend to the product market.
As established by Amir (2000), the AJ and KMZ models di®er with re-
spect to some key conclusions and policy descriptions. The AJ model seems
to be of limited validity for large spillover levels as for these values indus-
try R&D investment has increasing returns to scale, while individual R&D
has decreasing returns. Equilibrium predictions of both models can be made
equivalent by using a steeper cost function in the AJ model.
Yi (1996) adds that the range of spillover rates where R&D cooperation
raises social welfare compared to R&D competition broadens, the higher the
elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand function gets. In addition, Simp-
son and Vonortas (1994) argue that suboptimal investment in cost-reducing
R&D under R&D competition is not only more likely the larger the degree
of spillovers, but also the greater the convexity of the demand curve. They
further ¯nd that when demand is concave, R&D cooperation with a single
research lab always improves social welfare, while when demand is convex it
only does when there are su±cient spillovers.
A further generalisation is found in Ziss (1994). His analysis is based on
general demand and cost functions that satisfy conditions for a symmetric
and unique equilibrium to exist in the product market (second stage). Ziss
(1994) also allows for product di®erentiation and price as well as output
competition in the product market. A thorough analysis of the strategic
e®ects of R&D investment, referring to how second-stage actions (prices or
14quantities) are a®ected by R&D, is also provided in his paper. He ¯nds
that|due to a negative strategic e®ect|the existence of large spillovers in
an industry does not guarantee that RJVs improve welfare compared to a
situation where ¯rms choose R&D non-cooperatively. The author also ¯nds
that the movement from a fully non-cooperative regime to price collusion
(without R&D cooperation) can be welfare-improving for large spillovers.
1.4 Other models of R&D cooperation
The bulk of the literature on R&D cooperation is based on models with
cost-reducing R&D activities or process R&D and only few have analysed
R&D cooperation in the context of other models. We further distinguish
between models where the R&D stage is a patent race and models where
R&D improves product quality or enhances product di®erentiation.
1.4.1 Patent race
Some years ahead of the emergence of what has become the mainstream lit-
erature on knowledge spillovers and R&D cooperation, Reinganum (1981)
examined the issues in a stochastic patent race framework. In her model,
although perfect patent protection is assumed, imperfect appropriability is
incorporated by allowing for knowledge spillovers between rivals in a similar
way as in (later) non-tournament models. R&D cooperation also refers to
joint pro¯t maximisation. Conclusions on whether cooperation is socially
bene¯cial are very similar to conclusions of non-tournament models. With-
out knowledge spillovers, innovation of competing rivals occurs on average
sooner than innovation of cooperative ¯rms while with complete knowledge
spillovers, cooperating ¯rms are the ¯rst to innovate. Consequently, the de-
gree of spillovers is a critical value in determining under what R&D mode
innovation occurs most rapidly. Similar conclusions are made by Miyagiwa
and Ohno (2002) where the critical threshold relates to the speed of spillovers.
More speci¯cally, with slow (fast) spillovers, R&D cooperation lowers (in-
creases) R&D investment.
Silipo (2001) introduces the possibility of R&D cooperation in the model
of Fudenberg et al. (1983). He de¯nes R&D cooperation as a situation where
¯rms share costs and bene¯ts (in this case a prize) of their research activities.
It turns out that ¯rms undertake an RJV if they have the same amount of
accumulated knowledge in the beginning of the race. If the gap between
a leader and a follower is too large, no RJVs are formed. Furthermore,
cooperative agreements are broken up at the end of the race if competition
15is expected in the subsequent market, while they are not if a possibility to
collude exists. As such, at the end of a race incentives to reduce costs are
replaced by incentives to become a monopolist. As in the situation without
spillovers in Reinganum (1981), cooperation tends to reduce the speed of
innovation.
1.4.2 Product R&D
Motta (1992) was the ¯rst to present an analysis of R&D cooperation where
R&D is aimed at improving the quality of a product. For this purpose, it is
assumed that consumers incorporate product quality in their utility function,
which yields non-linear (inverse) demand curves. Only vertical product dif-
ferentiation is taken into account. By doing R&D, ¯rms are able to increase
the quality of their product above a minimum level. The model has three
stages, in a ¯rst stage ¯rms decide whether or not to enter the market, in a
second stage they invest in R&D and in a third stage they choose outputs.
Findings are very similar to the basic models of R&D cost reduction. R&D
cooperation|where it is assumed that between cooperating ¯rms spillovers
are higher compared to when no cooperation occurs|enhances welfare com-
pared to non-cooperative behaviour for spillover levels that exceed a certain
threshold. An additional result is that when spillovers are not too high, un-
der R&D competition only a ¯nite number of ¯rms enters the market, while
under R&D cooperation more ¯rms enter.
Poyago-Theotoky (1997) models product R&D in a di®erent way and
also takes horizontal product di®erentiation into account which yield other
demand functions than in Motta (1992). It is further assumed that the
market consists of two ¯rms that are specialised in improving one out of two
characteristics of the product and two ¯rms that are specialised in the other
characteristic. By doing R&D individually, ¯rms can improve their product
only in `their' characteristic16 and by forming an RJV, ¯rms can improve their
product in both characteristics and develop as such a \superproduct" which
is sold at a common price. Innovation is an uncertain event and becomes
more probable as investment in R&D increases. The main conclusion is
that cooperation in R&D (that extends to the product market in a natural
way) is welfare enhancing when the quality improvement of the resulting new
product is high or when R&D is relatively ine±cient and has high decreasing
returns.
Examples of oligopoly models where R&D enhances product di®erentia-
16Note that this model has some characteristics of a tournament model, because only
one patent is granted per characteristic of the product.
16tion are Lambertini and Rossini (1998) and Cellini and Lambertini (2002).
If all ¯rms decide not to invest in R&D, products remain homogenous and
the more ¯rms invest, the more di®erentiated products become. In the for-
mer model, it is shown that ¯rms may end up producing homogenous goods
and that R&D incentives are higher under Bertrand competition than under
Cournot competition. The main ¯nding based on the latter, dynamic, model
is that in the steady-state equilibrium R&D investment and thus also product
di®erentiation are higher under R&D cooperation than under competition.
1.5 Important issues related to models of R&D
cooperation
1.5.1 Information sharing
As argued in AJ and KMZ it is quite unlikely that the formation of coop-
erative R&D agreements is only restricted to joint pro¯t maximisation and
not related to the sharing of information. Obviously, we would expect that if
¯rms make agreements on their R&D investment, more information will be
shared than without an agreement. This section gives an overview of papers
that deal with the topic of information sharing and endogenous spillovers.
We ¯nd two distinct ways of dealing with the issue of R&D cooperation
with information sharing in the literature. The ¯rst is to keep the spillover
exogenous and assume that as ¯rms cooperate in R&D, the level of spillovers
increases, compared to a situation without R&D cooperation (Kamien et al.,
1992; Choi, 1993; Brod and Shivakumar, 1997; Miyagiwa and Ohno, 2002;
Hinloopen, 2003). The second approach is to endogenise the spillover pa-
rameter and thus to treat the level of spillover or information sharing as a
decision variable.
Brod and Shivakumar (1997) allow for product di®erentiation and n ¸ 2
¯rms in the AJ model and assume that the spillover parameter becomes one
under R&D cooperation. R&D cooperation in their model thus combines
joint pro¯t maximisation with respect to R&D and full information sharing.
They ¯nd that cooperative R&D always yields more pro¯t and is always
preferred on welfare grounds. Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) who make a similar
assumption in a patent race framework ¯nd that information sharing does
not always yield more pro¯t (e.g. if there are many ¯rms in the market),
but is preferred on welfare grounds. Hinloopen (2003) ¯nds that in a two-
stage duopoly with homogenous goods based on Kamien et al. (1992), even
if the pre-cooperative spillover level is small, R&D cooperation could be
17preferred on welfare-grounds, i.e. when cooperation yields high enough post-
cooperative spillovers.
Let us turn to some examples of models where the spillover level is en-
dogenous. Kultti and Takalo (1998), Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), Poyago-
Theotoky and Lambertini et al. (2004) simply introduce an additional stage
in the basic duopoly model that follows the R&D stage and proceeds the pro-
duction stage with Cournot competition. In Kultti and Takalo (1998) in the
¯rst, R&D, stage there are no spillovers and in the second stage ¯rms have
to decide on whether they would exchange their R&D results, yes or no. The
¯nding is that ¯rms have incentives to share information. Poyago-Theotoky
and Lambertini et al. (2004) let ¯rms decide on the height of the spillover
after having made an R&D decision. The outcome is that under R&D com-
petition no information will be disclosed while under R&D cooperation in-
formation is fully shared. Similar results are found in Amir et al. (2003) on
the basis of a two-stage model|with possible exogenous spillovers|where
cooperative ¯rms take R&D and within-RJV information sharing decisions
simultaneously in the ¯rst stage17.
In a stochastic framework Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) ¯nd that ¯rms
in the same industry will not disclose more information than the minimum
level of already existing exogenous spillovers, while under R&D cooperation
at least one ¯rm will fully share information, provided that R&D of both
¯rms is successful18. Information-sharing under R&D cooperation is not
always maximal nor symmetric though due to anti-competitive reasons.
An additional stage that precedes the R&D decision stage has been added
to a basic-two-stage model by Kamien and Zang (2000). Firms choose the
extent of spillovers their R&D activities generate (outgoing spillovers) before
deciding on R&D and at the same time allow for involuntary (exogenous)
spillovers. They also assume that ¯rms need some absorptive capacity, by
doing R&D themselves, to be able to take advantage of knowledge °ows from
competitors (see also 1.5.6). Much related to previous results they ¯nd that
if ¯rms cooperate in R&D, they choose to fully share their knowledge. If
R&D budgets are set non-cooperatively, ¯rms choose to keep at least part
of their knowledge private. Only when no exogenous spillovers exist, would
they disclose all their knowledge. What the consequences are for welfare is
not clear.
17They also leave out the assumption of ex post symmetry of R&D decisions of ¯rms in
an R&D cartel, but the consequences of this are discussed in the section 1.5.2.
18In complementary industries information-sharing with and without cooperation is
identical and may be maximal even without R&D cooperation.
181.5.2 Asymmetry
There are two forms of asymmetries; ex ante asymmetries and ex post asym-
metries. Ex ante symmetries are related to initial assumptions on the model's
parameters, while ex post asymmetries refer to outcomes of a model which is
not necessarily ex ante asymmetric. Within the literature on ex ante symme-
tries we make a further distinction between models where the asymmetries
are related to production or R&D cost parameters and models that build on
the assumption of asymmetric spillovers.
RÄ oller et al. (1998) introduce the possibility of asymmetric initial unit
costs in a duopoly model with allowance for complementary and substitutable
products, where it is assumed that without (with) R&D cooperation there
are no (complete) spillovers. They ¯nd that the higher cost ¯rm always
has an incentive to participate in an RJV, while the low cost ¯rm only has
an incentive when products are enough di®erentiated and when the cost
asymmetry is not too large19. In Lukach and Plasmans (2000) asymmetry
with respect to unit cost and R&D cost functions is introduced in the AJ
model. It is assumed that the larger ¯rm has a smaller unit production cost
and a lower marginal R&D cost. An important result of their model is that in
a welfare-maximising scenario, levels of R&D are asymmetric and that only
the larger ¯rm produces output, while both ¯rms remain active in R&D. In
general, conclusions on industry R&D, output and total welfare are similar
to the original AJ ¯ndings.
Petit and Tolwinski (1999) consider asymmetries in initial unit costs
and rates at which unit costs decline with accumulated R&D in a dynamic
duopoly framework with general nonlinear demand and cost functions. When
the assumption of ex ante symmetry is kept, conclusions regarding R&D and
welfare of the dynamic model are similar to the ones reached in earlier mod-
els such as the AJ model. When asymmetries are introduced, the ¯rm that
starts with the high unit cost or has a lower innovation rate gets driven out of
the market, unless there are knowledge spillovers that make the ¯rm reduce
its cost for free. Furthermore, incentives to form RJVs can be very low in
asymmetric markets while for consumer surplus the existence of technology
sharing and the formation of RJVs is advantageous.
In Amir and Wooders (1999, 2000) the e®ects of one-way spillovers on
equilibrium predictions for symmetric ¯rms are examined. The set-up of
these models is the same as the basic set-up except in the way R&D spillovers
are modeled. R&D spillovers only °ow from the more R&D active to the
other ¯rm in an \all-or-nothing probabilistic fashion". The model only yields
19The authors do an empirical test of the model's predictions in the same paper. We
refer to the second chapter for details on this.
19asymmetric R&D equilibrium levels whereby the innovator|i.e. the ¯rm that
does the most R&D|sometimes conducts more R&D than an RJV cartel
would. Under these conditions pro¯t under R&D competition is also higher
than in the RJV cartel. Spillovers in Lambertini et al. (2004) are not assumed
to be one-way but simply asymmetric. Another source of asymmetry in both
papers is related to a ¯rm being a leader. In Lambertini et al. (2004) it is
assumed that one ¯rm takes a Stackelberg leader position in the ¯nal goods
market. In the case of exogenous spillovers, if the outgoing spillover of the
leader is su±ciently low, the leader invests more in R&D than the follower.
With endogenous spillovers, the leader invests less and the follower more than
under the Nash equilibrium. Welfare implications are not discussed in their
paper but they do ¯nd larger industry R&D e®ort under the Nash equilibrium
than under the Stackelberg equilibrium when spillovers are endogenous.
Finally, we look at ex post asymmetry. First, the issue of ex post asym-
metry arises in the context of stability of R&D equilibrium predictions. As
argued in Henriques (1990) and Amir and Wooders (1998), the symmetric
equilibrium under individual pro¯t maximisation with respect to R&D, as-
suming competition in the product market, is unstable for small spillover
values and speci¯c choices of the model's parameters. In this situation, the
stable equilibrium predictions can be corner solutions where only one of the
two ¯rms invests in R&D. Under certain conditions|i.e. initial unit costs be-
ing high compared to demand|even total industry pro¯t that corresponds
to these asymmetric non-cooperative solutions is larger than under R&D
cooperation with full information sharing (Amir and Wooders, 1998).
Assuming that equilibrium predictions are stable, it has been shown in
amongst others Amir et al. (2003) that the R&D equilibrium decisions in the
¯rst-stage of a non-cooperative R&D game with product market competition
in the second stage are unique and symmetric. So, not only are ¯rms ex
ante symmetric (by assumption) but the resulting ex post outcome is also
symmetry. In the cooperative game this ex post symmetry is not guaranteed
as argued in Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) and more formally proved in Salant
and Sha®er (1998)20. Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) ¯nd in a model that
includes uncertainty about R&D results that an RJV may close a lab for
anti-competitive reasons, i.e. to avoid competitive pressures that arise when
both ¯rms discover.
Salant and Sha®er (1998) use the AJ model to prove that members of an
RJV can gain higher pro¯ts by making unequal R&D investments compared
to when they would invest the same amount in R&D. An important impli-
20In Salant and Sha®er (1999) this issue is discussed in a more general two-stage Cournot
framework where ¯rst-stage actions a®ect marginal costs.
20cation of their analysis is that in the speci¯c framework they use it cannot
be concluded that welfare is reduced by allowing ¯rms to cooperate in R&D
when spillovers are su±ciently small. For certain parameter combinations,
the decline in consumer surplus is more than compensated by a rise in total
industry pro¯t21.
Finally, ex post asymmetries can also appear if the deterministic R&D
process is replaced by a stochastic one (as e.g. in Hauenschild, 2003). If e.g.
only one ¯rm succeeds in innovating, unit cost reductions and the resulting
product market outcomes naturally are asymmetric across ¯rms, given that
they do not cooperate in R&D.
1.5.3 Uncertainty
Models of R&D cooperation are often based on the assumption of a deter-
ministic relation between R&D investment and production cost reductions
and/or product innovation, while it is generally acknowledged that R&D and
in particular basic research is a highly uncertain activity. Naturally, when
incorporating uncertainty about R&D results in models of R&D coopera-
tion, it cannot be avoided that the resulting game has tournament features.
Indeed, when the success of R&D is uncertain, it is not sure that all ¯rms
succeed in ending up with innovations such as e.g. production cost reductions
or product improvements22.
Abstracting from spillovers that may generate incentives to cooperate
in R&D, Marjit (1991) deals with uncertainty in a duopoly model of cost-
reducing R&D. He ¯nds that cooperative R&D tends to be pro¯table when
the probability of success of R&D is either very high or very low, i.e. when
both ¯rms are not likely to gain a monopoly position by succeeding alone in
the R&D project.
In Choi (1993), Combs (1993) and Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) the prob-
ability of success of R&D is higher the more a ¯rm invests in R&D. Choi
(1993) assumes that under a cooperative R&D agreement, both ¯rms (a
duopoly is considered) have access to any innovation that is made and that
the probabilities of success remain independent among the members. He
further assumes that total industry pro¯t decreases as the level of spillovers
increases due to more intense product market competition. Findings are
21In a more general framework Dakhlia et al. (2003) identify conditions under which co-
operative asymmetric R&D decisions and the resulting increase in industry concentration
are welfare-reducing.
22For examples of models of R&D cooperation that incorporate uncertainty regarding
the date of innovation (stochastic patent races) we refer to section 1.4.1.
21that under perfect monitoring23 pro¯ts from cooperative R&D are higher
compared to the non-cooperative mode when the natural spillover level is
`high enough', while they may be higher or lower for low spillovers. Conclu-
sions regarding the gap between private and social incentives to cooperate in
R&D are very similar to earlier ¯ndings.
Finally, Hauenschild (2003) compares stochastic versions of the AJ and
the KMZ model with the original deterministic versions (see also section
1.5.4).
1.5.4 R&D input versus R&D output
As pointed out by Amir (2000) and suggested on the basis of empirical ev-
idence (see chapter 2), it is important to distinguish between input (as in
KMZ) and output spillovers (as in AJ) and as such between R&D input and
R&D output as decision variables. Input spillovers are more related to the
free access to e.g. basic research results in an industry, scienti¯c publications
or general information on what research is going on in the industry. Martin
(2002) provides the example of the pharmaceutical industry, where ¯rms'
scientists generally have \... a quite accurate idea of the nature of research
conducted by their competitors ...". Output spillovers rather refer to the
appropriability of new technologies that result from research, which can be
e.g. patented.
For the same level of spillovers, e®ective total cost reductions are always
higher in the AJ model with output spillovers compared to the KMZ model
with input spillovers when only symmetric solutions are considered, unless
there are no spillovers. This is not surprising because in the AJ model (with
output spillovers), only own R&D investment has decreasing returns and
R&D output of the other ¯rm is additively available.
Based on a comparison by Hauenschild (2003) of stochastic versions of
the AJ and KMZ models with homogenous goods and Cournot competition,
where R&D yields a unit cost reduction with a probability lower than 1, this
relation is somewhat modi¯ed. Indeed, with output spillovers expected cost
reductions tend to be reduced by the uncertainty, while increased with input
spillovers. As such, for some parameter combinations, e®ective total cost
reductions with input spillovers are expected to be higher than with output
spillovers.
Martin (2002) incorporates input and output spillovers in a stochastic
patent race model with two ¯rms. It is assumed that under R&D cooperation
the two ¯rms carry out R&D independently and R&D input spillovers are
23Each ¯rm can observe the other's R&D investment and outcome.
22complete. Findings are that R&D cooperation always yields higher total
welfare, but not higher pro¯t if either natural input spillovers are high and/or
output spillovers are low (high appropriability).
Another way of distinguishing between input and output spillovers is to
split up the R&D process into two stages (see e.g. Beath et al., 1998); one
stage that maps R&D input into R&D output and one stage that maps R&D
output into unit cost reductions. This approach not only makes it possible
to distinguish between input and output spillovers but also between di®erent
characteristics of the functions that map R&D input into output and R&D
output into cost reductions. Beath et al. (1998) show that it matters at
which stage diminishing returns of R&D set as to predict how many R&D
labs an RJV would operate.
1.5.5 Complementarity of R&D
It is clear that in the models of R&D cooperation overviewed so far, the
spillover parameter (often referred to as ¯) makes it possible for a ¯rm to
reduce unit production costs or enhance product quality without doing R&D
itself, i.e. by the R&D investment of other ¯rms. Moreover, the standard
assumption is that R&D input (in the case of KMZ-type models) or R&D
output (in the case of AJ-type models) of other ¯rms in the same market is
additive to a ¯rm's own R&D input or output24. The `degree' of additivity
depends on the height of the (exogenous) spillover ¯. When ¯ = 1 e.g.,
other's R&D is perfectly additive to own R&D.
The height of the spillover parameter is also related to the strategic prop-
erties of R&D decisions. It is standard in the duopoly literature that with
`low' spillovers, R&D decisions are strategic substitutes implying that the
best response of a ¯rm to an increase in the other's R&D investment, is to
decrease it's own R&D investment. Under these conditions, R&D investment
has negative externalities and R&D cooperation has an R&D-e®ort-saving ef-
fect in KMZ-type models and reduces R&D output (unit cost reduction) in
AJ-type models. This may be because ¯rms follow closely related R&D paths
and at least partly duplicate each other's R&D. With `high' spillovers, on the
other hand, R&D decisionsare strategic complements and have positive ex-
ternalities such that R&D cooperation enhances R&D investment or R&D
output in KMZ-type and AJ-type models respectively. In this case, one could
argue that R&D paths are rather complements.
In any case, the spillover parameter in standard models is highly related
24For an extensive comparison of additivity in AJ-type and KMZ-type models, we refer
to Hinloopen (2003).
23to complementarity properties of R&D investment. Beath et al. (1998) e.g.
make di®erent assumptions on the height of the spillover parameter depend-
ing on whether ¯rms follow a single research path or complementary research
paths. Findings are that only one lab will be operated with a single research
path and one or two with a complementary research path, depending on the
stage of the R&D process at which diminishing returns set in.
Examples where spillovers and properties of R&D related to the degree
of complementarity25 are formally disentangled are Katsoulacos and Ulph
(1998) and Anbarci et al. (2002).
While the standard assumption in AJ- and KMZ-type models is that un-
der R&D cooperation both ¯rms in duopoly keep doing R&D, Katsoulacos
and Ulph (1998) predict whether an RJV would operate one or two labs de-
pending on whether R&D outputs are (technical, not strategic) complements
or substitutes. When R&D outputs are very close substitutes, cost consid-
erations dominate such that an RJV would keep only one lab open. When
R&D outputs are very strong complements, an RJV may prefer to keep two
labs open.
Anbarci et al. (2002) adjust the KMZ-model and takes into account
whether R&D inputs are complements or substitutes. Only non-competitive
modes (i.e. R&D and RJV competition26) are looked at. They ¯nd that when
complementarity between R&D inputs is high RJV competition dominates
R&D competition in terms of technological improvement, industry pro¯t
and social welfare, irrespective of the level of exogenous spillovers. With
low complementarity the conclusions of KMZ apply and R&D competition is
preferred over RJV competition. For moderate degrees of complementarity,
RJV competition is likely to be preferred on social welfare grounds for all
levels of spillovers, but on grounds of technological improvement only when
spillovers are low.
1.5.6 Knowledge stock and absorptive capacity
Most previously discussed papers have ignored the possibility that cost-
reducing R&D expenditures and spillovers build on a pre-existing stock of
technological knowledge. First, one could distinguish between pre-competitive
research and competitive R&D (Vonortas, 1994). Pre-competitive or generic
research generates a general, imperfectly appropriable, knowledge stock and
25Note that complementarity of R&D should not be confused with complementarity
of ¯nal products. Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) e.g. also distinguish between same and
complementary industries. RÄ oller et al. (1998) is another example where complementary
industries are also modelled.
26Under RJV competition the spillover is set to one and pro¯t is individually maximised.
24competitive R&D draws from this knowledge stock and ¯nally results in more
appropriable and ¯rm-speci¯c cost reductions or product improvements. In
the model of Vonortas (1994) both result in unit cost reductions. Focus is
on cooperation in the pre-competitive stage. Conclusions are very similar to
the ones of models where the spillover is set to one under R&D cooperation.
Second, in the tradition of Cohen and Levinthal (1989), the knowledge
stock is often interpreted as a necessary condition for ¯rms to be able to
assimilate external knowledge. In other words, ¯rms need absorptive capac-
ity by doing R&D itself in order to reap bene¯ts from incoming knowledge
spillovers. Kamien and Zang (2000) rede¯ne spilt over R&D by a Cobb-
Douglas function that incorporates absorptive capacity e®ects. If a ¯rm
chooses to follow a narrow, ¯rm-speci¯c R&D program that does not gen-
erate spillovers to other ¯rms, it also has no absorptive capacity. On the
other hand, a basic approach yields a maximum level of outgoing spillovers
and absorptive capacity. They ¯nd that absorptive capacity e®ects increase
R&D investment.
Somewhat di®erent conclusions are made by GrÄ unfeld (2003) who intro-
duces absorptive capacity e®ects in the AJ model by letting the incoming
spillovers of a ¯rm depend on its own R&D expenditures. He ¯nds that
R&D incentives of non-cooperating ¯rms are only increased by absorptive
capacity e®ects when the market is small. Furthermore, the critical spillover
level at which cooperative R&D investment increases above non-cooperative
R&D investment is higher than in the original AJ model.
1.5.7 Subsidies
Another topic that has been studied in the context of multiple stage models
of R&D is the provision of government subsidies of R&D. Hinloopen (1997,
2000a,b, 2001) are examples of models that incorporate an analysis of R&D
subsidies in the familiar two-stage models of R&D by adding a stage in which
government decides on the height of an R&D subsidy. To cover the costs of
the subsidies ¯rms are taxed in the product market. The main ¯nding is
that optimally subsidizing non-cooperative R&D leads to a higher level of
R&D and welfare than other modes, including R&D cooperatives with full
information sharing, provided that spillovers are high enough. The highest
welfare is reached when ¯rms make their R&D decisions individually and
fully share information (spillover of one). Finally, optimally subsidizing non-
cooperative R&D without spillovers and cooperative R&D without spillovers
yields the same outcomes for R&D and social welfare.
25The study of Leahy and Neary (1997) provides a general27 oligopoly model
of R&D on the basis of which conclusions about optimal technology policy
are made. Outcomes of di®erent scenarios where ¯rms either set their R&D
in a ¯rst and their price/output in a second stage (\strategic behaviour") or
set their R&D and price/output simultaneously (\non-strategic behaviour")
are compared and ¯rst- and second-best optimal subsidies are calculated28.
The results con¯rm earlier results that stress the importance of the degree
of spillovers when considering the desirability of R&D cooperation from a
welfare point of view, assuming that ¯rms behave strategically. Without
strategic behaviour, R&D cooperation is always preferred and does not man-
date government subsidies as to obtain maximal welfare. Moreover, for most
scenarios non-strategic behaviour is preferred on welfare grounds and requires
lower subsidies.
1.5.8 Endogenous R&D cooperatives
In the part of literature discussed so far, the methodology that is used to
investigate the issue of R&D cooperation is to compare outcomes (R&D
decisions, pro¯t, quantities, prices, social welfare, etc.) of an industry con-
sisting of ¯rms that do not cooperate in R&D with outcomes of an industry
where all ¯rms cooperate in R&D. Few attention is paid to whether R&D
cooperatives are actually formed in equilibrium, how many are formed and
how many ¯rms they contain29.
In the ¯rst place, the issue of RJV formation has been addressed assum-
ing that only one RJV could be formed by two or more ¯rms in the industry.
In the models of Katz (1986) and Combs (1993) e.g., ¯rms decide whether to
participate in an RJV. In Katz (1986) ¯rms also decide what R&D cost and
information sharing rules to follow in the RJV whereby within-RJV spillovers
are assumed to be larger than spillovers between members and non-members.
The author proves that an equilibrium membership size exists that may be
equal to all ¯rms in the industry30. Forming an RJV is socially bene¯cial
27`Generality' in this context refers to non-linearity of demand functions and allowance
for Cournot (quantity) or Bertrand (price) competition in the product market.
28The instrument of government policy to stimulate R&D is in this context subsidis-
ing. First-best subsidies cover both R&D and output subsidies, as two targets are to be
controlled in the ¯rst-best solution (i.e. R&D investment and output), while second-best
subsidies only cover R&D subsidies.
29Stability of RJVs has been addressed by Veugelers and Kesteloot (1994) and Kesteloot
and Veugelers (1995) in a repeated-game framework, where it is assumed that ¯rms can
cheat on the part of knowledge sharing.
30E.g. if spillovers between non-members would be zero and R&D investment of members
would be higher than investment of non-members, the equilibrium RJV contains all ¯rms
26when rivalry in the product market is low, when research is rather comple-
mentary, when important spillovers exist and when the formation of the RJV
yields a high degree of information sharing. Combs (1993) develops a stochas-
tic model where the probability of becoming an innovator can be increased
with the amount of R&D expenditures and by joining an RJV. Within an
RJV R&D is chosen cooperatively and the innovation can be accessed freely
by all members. Findings are that as the probability of innovating increases,
more ¯rms enter the RJV, but the number of RJV members never exceeds
the socially optimal number. Product market competition increases with
the rate of research success, resulting in higher consumer surplus and total
welfare.
Atallah (2003) assumes that higher within-RJV information sharing also
yields more leakage to non-members. He ¯nds that R&D spending of RJV
members is reduced when the degree of outside leakage increases. Further-
more, with high outside leakage, the size of the RJV is also reduced ¶ and RJV
members share less information while with low outside leakage, the RJV gets
larger and full information sharing is maintained. Poyago-Theotoky (1995)
¯nds that, for small rates of spillovers and R&D being a strategic substitute
for non-cooperating ¯rms outside the RJV, the equilibrium number of ¯rms
that form an RJV is lower than the socially optimal number which is all ¯rms
in the industry.
Kamien and Zang (1993) allow for an industry which is divided into sev-
eral equally sized RJV cartels that set cooperative R&D levels and fully share
information. They ¯nd that an industry with two RJV cartels yields lower
prices than an industry-wide RJV if the produced goods are substitutes or
if spillovers between competing ¯rms are small.
In other models the number of RJVs that arises is endogenous. A ¯rst
strand of literature, sometimes called the coalition formation literature, al-
lows for exclusive groups of any size between a subset of ¯rms in an industry
where exclusive refers to the assumption that a ¯rm can only participate in
one coalition. An example of a model where cost reductions are exogenous,
meaning that they are an immediate result of the coalition that is formed, is
Bloch (1995). In a ¯rst stage ¯rms decide in a non-cooperative and sequen-
tial game whether to form or enter in a coalition31. If all ¯rms agree, then
a coalition is formed. It is assumed that marginal production costs decrease
linearly with the size of the coalition. In a second stage the ¯rms are assumed
to be Bertrand or Cournot competitors in a market of di®erentiated prod-
in the industry.
31One ¯rm ¯rst proposes to a chosen set of ¯rms to form a coalition and only if all the
other ¯rms agree, the coalition will be formed. The ¯rst ¯rm that does not want to enter
the proposed coalition, becomes the next initiator.
27ucts. The equilibrium prediction (based on the Markov-perfect equilibrium
concept) in the context of a linear model is that ¯rms form two asymmetric
associations, one containing 3/4 ¯rms and the other containing the rest of
the ¯rms while the socially optimal outcome is one coalition that consists of
all ¯rms in the market. Further, it is found that ¯rms form larger coalitions
as products are more di®erentiated.
An implication of the assumption of exogenous cost reductions is that
¯rms that are outside coalitions are unable to reduce costs by doing R&D.
In Yi and Shin (2000) cost reductions are endogenous in the sense that all
¯rms make R&D decisions, either outside or within a coalition. Findings are
that on welfare grounds, an \exclusive membership rule" is preferred over
an \open membership rule" for high spillovers32. On the other hand, the
equilibrium RJV structure is mostly not the socially e±cient outcome which
is as in previous models an industry-wide RJV. Greenlee and Cassiman (1999)
¯nd similar results for high spillovers and relatively low R&D costs, given
competition in the product market. For very high spillovers and low R&D
costs, product market collusion may even be desirable on welfare grounds.
At the same time a related but di®erent approach to model R&D collabo-
ration has evolved, i.e. the literature on networks33. Here, coalitions between
¯rms are pair-wise and non-exclusive (a ¯rm can be in more than one coali-
tion, therefore the term `network' is more appropriate). Goyal and Moraga
(2001) were the ¯rst to investigate the issue using a network approach with
endogenous cost reductions. Firms have to decide in a ¯rst stage whether
they will form collaborative links with other ¯rms which is presented as a
binary variable. If a coalition is formed, spillovers are complete within the
coalition. In the second stage ¯rms choose their R&D e®ort individually, as
in a non-cooperative game, and in a third stage ¯rms make their familiar
production decisions. Within this framework the e®ects of the formation
of symmetric as well as asymmetric networks on R&D behaviour are exam-
ined for ¯rms that compete in a homogenous goods market and for ¯rms that
operate in independent markets34. Findings are that, irrespective of the mar-
ket setting, the formation of a complete network is strategically stable. Only
when markets are independent, this network is the unique strategically sta-
ble network. In homogenous goods markets, the level of collaboration in the
complete network may be too high from a social welfare and industry-pro¯t
32Under the exclusive membership rule, existing RJV members have to agree for an
outsider to join the RJV, which is not the case under the open membership rule.
33See Goyal and Morago-Gonz¶ alez (2002) for a literature overview that incorporates
models of vertically related ¯rms.
34In an independent market individual R&D decisions do not in°uence the level of
competitiveness.
28maximising perspective, and a partial network is optimal. In the indepen-
dent markets, it is socially optimal ¶ and industry-pro¯t maximising to form
a complete network.
In Goyal and Joshi (2003) a similar model is developed to investigate the
link between ¯rms' incentives to cooperate and the nature of market com-
petition. Cost reduction in the model is exogenous which implies that only
¯rms that enter a coalition, can reduce marginal production costs. Addi-
tionally, costs of forming links can be low or high. With small linking costs,
the complete network is uniquely strategically stable and welfare-maximising
under quantity competition. With high linking costs, asymmetric networks
are stable, but it is unclear which networks are welfare-maximising. Under
price competition, the unique stable network is an empty one, independent of
the level of linking cost, while an asymmetric network is welfare-maximising.
1.6 R&D cooperation and price collusion
In the models that are overviewed so far, a crucial assumption on which most
¯ndings are based, is the assumption of independence between the decision
to cooperate in R&D or to enter an RJV and the decision to cooperate in the
product market. Indeed, by using the backward induction rule the equilib-
rium prediction that always results is competition in prices or in quantities.
The question naturally arises whether this assumption is a valid one, whether
cooperation in the R&D stage does not spill over to collusion in the product
market35. This question has been looked at in some of the above papers (see
e.g. Hinloopen, 1997) but formal modeling has been left for others36.
A ¯rst way of dealing with the topic is to assume that cooperation in R&D
automatically extends to cooperation in the product market. An example
of this approach is Poyago-Theotoky (1997)37 who sets up a model with
product innovation and without cost sharing between ¯rms. The underlying
assumption that cooperation in R&D also extends to the product market
35A nice overview of the existence of multi-R&D-project and multimarket contact be-
tween ¯rms in RJVs that are formed under the National Cooperative Research Act in the
US is provided by Vonortas (2000). The author suggests that the scope for collusive play
in the product market is enlarged by the combination of multiproject and multimarket
contact.
36In Kline (2000) conditions are derived for a cost paradox to occur at the non-
cooperative equilibrium, which refers to industry-wide cost-reductions that enhance com-
petition such that pro¯t ¯nally falls. Under these conditions and when spillovers are less
than perfect, cooperative ¯rms reduce their research and may use the RJV to reduce
product market competition.
37See also the previous section 1.4.2.
29by the setting up of a common price for the \superproduct" that results
from the RJV formation is necessary for ¯rms to have incentives to form an
RJV. As already mentioned, the main conclusion is that cooperation in R&D
(that extends to the product market) is welfare enhancing when the quality
improvement of the resulting new product is high or when R&D is relatively
ine±cient and has high decreasing returns.
A repeated-game framework is another approach to examine the relation
between the two forms of cooperation. In Martin (1995) e.g., the e®ects of
R&D joint ventures on the pervasiveness of tacit collusion in the product
market are examined in a patent race model without spillovers. The author
uses a non-cooperative repeated-game framework and assumes that ¯rms
follow a trigger strategy with product market collusion being an equilibrium
strategy when the present value of pro¯ts gained from colluding is larger than
the present value of pro¯ts gained from defecting. It is found that forming
an R&D joint venture makes it more likely for tacit collusion to be sustained
in the product market.
Another example of the second approach is van Wegberg (1995). His
analysis is based on an extension of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) to a
model with three ¯rms and products that are imperfect substitutes. In the
paper some speci¯c cases are identi¯ed in which the formation of an R&D
alliance of two out of three ¯rms could lead to collusion in output in an
in¯nitely repeated non-cooperative game context.
Further, in Cabral (2000) interactions between R&D and price decisions
are examined in an in¯nite duopoly framework where ¯rms are to make R&D
and price decisions simultaneously. Only if R&D is successful, higher pro¯ts
are gained. The ¯ndings are that self-enforcing R&D agreements that in-
crease R&D towards an e±cient level decrease prices while R&D contracting
results in increased prices.
Finally, Lambertini et al. (2002) examine the interplay between product
R&D and pricing decisions in a non-cooperative framework and ¯nd that
joint product development decreases horizontal product di®erentiation and
thereby destabilises collusion. When ¯rms keep developing their products
independently, there is more horizontal product di®erentiation which can
facilitate price collusion.
1.7 Conclusion
R&D behaviour of ¯rms in oligopoly has attracted a great deal of attention
of IO theorists. The issue of R&D cooperation has mainly been examined in
the context of non-tournament models where R&D is often assumed to be
30cost-reducing. A general result, whether the underlying model is symmetric
or asymmetric, of a tournament or non-tournament kind, related to process
or product R&D, etc., is the ¯nding that the level of knowledge spillovers
is important in determining whether ¯rms' R&D incentives, pro¯t and so-
cial welfare are higher/lower if ¯rms cooperate in R&D compared to when
they do not cooperate. Moreover, if either pre-cooperative or at least post-
cooperative spillovers are above a certain threshold, R&D cooperation would
be preferred on welfare grounds in a symmetric industry while otherwise
R&D competition is preferable.
Factors have been identi¯ed that may increase or decrease the desirabil-
ity of the formation of RJVs on welfare grounds. First, a low degree of
rivalry in the product market seems to make the formation of RJVs more
desirable. Allowing for ex post asymmetry of cooperative R&D decisions may
also improve total welfare e®ects of R&D cooperation since a non-cooperative
regime no longer prevails for low spillovers. Further, if ¯rms do not behave
strategically in the R&D stage and thus decide simultaneously on R&D and
product market actions, R&D cooperation is always desirable, irrespective of
the size of spillovers. R&D cooperation is also always desirable if it implies
full information sharing.
RJVs are not always desirable though. If they are mainly created to
reduce competition in the product market (cfr. negative strategic e®ects of
cooperative R&D and the cost paradox), they may not be welfare-improving,
even for industries with high spillovers. The probability of price collusion
may increase when cooperative R&D agreements are formed, which should
be taken into account when evaluating the formation of RJVs. On the other
hand, collusion in the product market does not always reduce welfare com-
pared to fully non-cooperative decisions. It does not e.g. when spillovers
are high and products are to a certain extent di®erentiated or when product
quality has increased a lot as a consequence of the RJV formation.
Whether ¯rms have incentives to engage in industry-wide R&D coopera-
tion also depends on a number of factors. In an ex ante symmetric duopoly
industry ¯rms prefer to cooperate in R&D|provided that the cooperative
R&D level can be credibly committed to|since pro¯ts they then gain are
higher than under R&D competition, irrespective of the size of spillovers.
In a non-cooperative context, where the cooperative R&D level cannot be
enforced, ¯rms also have some incentives to cooperate in R&D, but the SPN
prediction is R&D competition.
If initial unit production costs or spillovers are ex ante asymmetric or if
R&D decisions are ex post asymmetric because of the symmetric equilibrium
being unstable, pro¯ts are sometimes higher if ¯rms do not coordinate their
research activities. As such, ¯rms would naturally prefer not to cooperate in
31R&D while R&D cooperation may still yield a higher consumer surplus. In
the case of cost asymmetries, if products are enough di®erentiated and asym-
metries are not too large, incentives to form an RJV may be high enough.
In an oligopoly, industry-wide R&D cooperation is usually the most so-
cially bene¯cial mode, but it is not necessarily the equilibrium prediction.
Conclusions depend on whether a ¯rm can participate in only one coopera-
tive R&D project or in several. But again, the degree of product di®erenti-
ation positively a®ects incentives to form and welfare e®ects of a wide R&D
agreement.
To conclude, before deciding whether to promote R&D cooperation in
a certain sector, a government should have an idea on the characteristics
of the sector. The extent of exogenous knowledge spillovers, the number of
¯rms in the sector, the size di®erences between ¯rms, the willingness of ¯rms
to share information, the (di®erence in) R&D costs, the degree of product
di®erentiation etc., are important factors that should in°uence this decision.
Furthermore, policy makers should also realize that cooperation in the R&D
stage may translate into cooperation in the product market. Empirical and
experimental research can provide more information on these issues.
32Chapter 2
Empirics of R&D cooperation
and spillovers
2.1 Introduction
It became clear in chapter 1 that knowledge spillovers play an important role
in game-theoretic models of R&D cooperation. First, under the assumption
that ¯rms cannot control the information °ows between themselves and other
¯rms, spillovers are important when comparing R&D cooperation modes with
R&D competition modes with respect to the level of R&D investment, to-
tal industry pro¯t and social welfare. Second, with spillovers being under
control of ¯rms, they are naturally also important because in that case they
represent a decision variable in the model. Given the importance of spillovers
in the theoretical framework and the empirical evidence for the existence of
important knowledge °ows between ¯rms (see e.g. Griliches, 1992), it would
be a logical next step to ¯nd empirical regularities on the relation with R&D
cooperation.
In the empirical literature on R&D investment, R&D cooperation and
spillovers we ¯nd two distinct approaches related to two distinct research
questions. The ¯rst approach closely follows (speci¯c models discussed in) the
theoretical literature surveyed in the previous chapter as to predict whether
or not spillovers among ¯rms in an industry are low or high. Spillovers are
expected to be low (high), if R&D cooperation has decreased (increased)
R&D investment. An overview of papers where this approach is followed is
given in section 2.3.
The second approach rather expands the theoretical literature by exam-
ining the e®ect of spillovers on incentives to cooperate in R&D. There exists
a strand of empirical literature on the determinants of R&D cooperation and
33on pro¯tability of R&D cooperation but focus has been mainly placed on the
e®ects of ¯rm size, R&D e®ort or intensity and market structure variables in
general1. The relation between R&D spillovers and incentives to enter into
cooperative R&D agreements has only very recently been studied empirically.
We provide an overview of this approach in section 2.4.
Before having a closer look at these empirical analyses, we present in
section 2.2 a short overview of the existing methodologies and results of
measuring technological spillovers.
2.2 Measuring spillovers
`Technological spillovers' stand for all information and knowledge °ows be-
tween economic agents. After having excluded the externalities that result
from R&D inputs being purchased at a price less than their \full quality"
price, which are sometimes called \rent spillovers" (Griliches, 1992) or \pe-
cuniary spillovers" (Vonortas, 1997), these °ows can arise through many
di®erent channels such as e.g. the movement of R&D personnel, the exis-
tence of formal and informal networks and meetings2, publications related to
research output, patent applications and reverse engineering. Consequently,
technological spillovers are unmeasurable and ¯nding the most appropriate
proxy is a complicated matter3.
Nadiri (1993) distinguishes two basic methodologies that have been used
in the literature to proxy spillovers. First, there is the \technology °ow"
approach where ¯rms and/or industries are positioned in a matrix with tech-
nological or other linkages. It is assumed that the total incoming spillovers of
a ¯rm or industry are equal to a (weighted) sum of knowledge stocks of other
¯rms or industries, where the knowledge stock is calculated on the basis of
e.g. R&D investment, R&D personnel, number of patents or any other inno-
vation variable. The calculation of the weights is often based on a measure of
technological distance (developed by Ja®e, 1986) and sometimes on a measure
of geographical distance given the assumption that the closer ¯rms or indus-
tries are in their technologies or in their geographical location, the higher
the probability of knowledge °ows. Measures of technological distance are
1Clear overviews are in Veugelers (1998) and Belderbos et al. (2003). See also e.g.
Vonortas (1997).
2In a recent study, Dahl and Pedersen (2003) report results of a survey that provide
evidence for the existence of important knowledge °ows through informal contacts between
employees of ¯rms within networks.
3Vonortas (1997) further distinguishes \network spillovers" that are present when the
success of a new R&D project and as such the incentives to start a new R&D project
strongly depend on other complementary R&D projects or technologies.
34often based on patent data in the assumption that spillovers between ¯rms
or industries are higher when patent activities overlap, but other measures,
such as e.g. the share of scientists in total personnel (Kaiser, 2002b) or the
number of cooperative R&D ties (Dumont and Tsakanikas, 2001), have also
emerged. Since the emergence of new surveys such as e.g. the Community
Innovation Survey (CIS) which includes questions on appropriability of re-
search results and on usefulness of outside sources of knowledge, the weights
can also be calculated in a direct way (Kaiser, 2002b).
Another approach to measure spillovers is the \cost or production func-
tion" approach4 (see e.g. Bernstein, 1989; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Capron
and Cincera, 1998; Rouvinen, 2002). Basically a cost or production function
is estimated where next to the usual right-hand side variables, i.e. output
and relative factor prices of variable and ¯xed inputs including R&D in the
case of a cost function approach or stocks of variable and ¯xed inputs includ-
ing the R&D stock in the case of a production function approach, similar
variables that represent other ¯rms' R&D stock are added to the equation.
The estimated coe±cients of these other ¯rms' R&D stock variables give an
indication of the degree of spillovers between the ¯rms.
In any case, irrespective of the approach used, the general conclusion that
can be made on the basis of empirical studies is that knowledge spillovers
between ¯rms and industries exist and than they are potentially important.
2.3 Relation between R&D cooperation and
R&D e®ort
When closely following the standard theoretical IO literature, R&D coopera-
tion would stimulate R&D expenditures of the participating ¯rms if spillovers
among these ¯rms are high. As such, the main aim of entering the cooperative
R&D agreement can be assumed to be internalising spillovers by eliminating
free-rider e®ects. On the other hand, when R&D cooperation would decrease
R&D expenditures, the formation of the R&D cooperative can be assumed
to be aimed at cost-sharing. In this case, spillovers among the participating
¯rms will be low.
In Vonortas (1997, chapter 7) industry- and ¯rm-level analyses are per-
formed of the e®ect of RJV formation based on the US National Cooperative
RJVs Act (NCRA) on R&D intensity. Only for some industries it has been
found that RJV participation decreased R&D intensity, thereby providing
4For literature overviews we refer to Nadiri (1993) and Cincera and van Pottelsberghe
de la Potterie (2001).
35support for cost-sharing motives to be important when engaging in R&D
cooperation. For other industries, and in general, e®ects are statistically
insigni¯cant.
Based on micro-aggregated data of the ¯rst Community Innovation Sur-
vey (CIS) on four manufacturing industries Lambertini et al. (2004) derive
some empirical evidence on R&D behaviour of ¯rms in general, and of Stack-
elberg leaders and followers (see their model in sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2).
By employing simple analyses of variance, the authors ¯nd that R&D in-
vestment, and in the textiles and clothing industries also R&D intensity, of
cooperating ¯rms is higher than of non-cooperating ¯rms. This should indi-
cate that pre- and or post-cooperative spillovers are high, especially in the
textiles and clothing industries. Other ANOVA tests indicate that spillovers5
are larger among ¯rms that cooperate in R&D than among ¯rms that do not
cooperate, except in the textiles industry.
Furthermore, if in each industry Stackelberg leaders are characterised
(based on the Linda index), the authors ¯nd that these leaders invest more
in R&D than the followers. Leaders in the textiles and clothing industries
also have higher R&D intensities. Following their model, this indicates that
control over spillovers is relatively low and that spillovers from the leaders
to the followers are low.
RÄ oller et al. (1998) also partly6 apply this approach and ¯nd|on the basis
of data coming from US NCRA ¯rms|that within and between some indus-
tries cost-sharing is more important while for other industries, internalising
the free-rider e®ect seems to be more important. In general, the cost-sharing
e®ect dominates though. Results also indicate that RJVs among ¯rms of
similar size (symmetric ¯rms) and large RJVs are better in internalising
spillovers.
2.4 Spillovers as incentives to cooperate in
R&D
An established result from the IO literature where spillovers are assumed to
be exogenous is that in general, R&D cooperation is only welfare-enhancing
if (either pre- and post-cooperative or at least post-cooperative) spillovers
between ¯rms are above a certain threshold level. But since in these models
5Measured as the product of R&D intensity and the sum of R&D investment of other
¯rms in the same industry and the same country.
6They also estimate whether cost-sharing motives or motives of internalising spillovers
are important for RJV formation. See section 2.4 for their results on this.
36pro¯ts of ¯rms are higher under R&D cooperation compared to R&D com-
petition, irrespective of the spillover level, it would ceteris paribus always be
advantageous for ¯rms to cooperate in R&D. A natural question would then
be whether ¯rms' incentives to cooperate in R&D are actually in°uenced by
spillovers.
As mentioned in section 2.3, RÄ oller et al. (1998) examined which motives|
motives of cost-sharing or motives of internalising spillovers (i.e. eliminat-
ing free-rider e®ects)|are most important for US NCRA ¯rms, where cost-
sharing and internalising spillovers are approximated by a measure of how
¯rm-level R&D changed. They further examined to what extent asymmetries
and product complementarities are important for the formation of RJVs7.
The dependent variable was created by matching all ¯rms in pairs and is
equal to one if the pair participated in an RJV and equal to zero otherwise.
Control variables that enter the equation are the size of the RJV, the number
of RJVs the pair participated in, industry dummies that indicate whether
both ¯rms are in the same industry and dummies that indicate the di®erent
industries of the ¯rms.
On the basis of the results of their probit estimation procedure the authors
conclude that RJVs among ¯rms of similar size (symmetric ¯rms) and large
RJVs tend to be formed more often. In general, the cost-sharing e®ect is more
important in explaining the probability of RJV formation than the free-rider
e®ect. Finally, for some industries the existence of product complementarities
can stimulate the formation of RJVs.
Recently, econometric analyses have been carried out that identify the
e®ects of spillovers on R&D cooperation. Examples are a study of Belgian
¯rms on the basis of the European CIS (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002), a
study of German service ¯rms (Kaiser, 2002a), a study of European ¯rms that
participated in EU Framework Programmes and Eureka projects (Hern¶ an
et al., 2003) and a study based on Dutch CIS data (Belderbos et al., 2003).
In the papers cross-sectional probit or logit estimations have been carried
out of an equation with the dependent variable being the probability that a
¯rm enters a cooperative R&D agreement with at least one other ¯rm. The
econometric issue of possible simultaneity between the decision to cooperate
in R&D and right-hand-side variables as R&D intensity has been dealt with
in di®erent ways.
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) have distinguished between the e®ects of
incoming and outgoing spillovers on the probability of entering a cooperative
R&D agreement. Incoming spillovers are ¯rm-speci¯c and are measured on
7The empirical part in their paper is based on a model they developed in a ¯rst part.
We refer to section 1.5.2 in the previous chapter for more details of the model.
37the basis of CIS questionnaire ratings of the importance of publicly available
information of di®erent types for ¯rms. On the basis of similar ratings of the
e®ectiveness of methods for protecting products and processes, a proxy for
outgoing spillovers (or appropriability) has been created. In the same ques-
tionnaire ¯rms were asked whether they have participated in a cooperative
project, which provides a basis for the (binary) dependent variable. Other
variables added to the econometric equation are ¯rm size, a permanent R&D
dummy, industry level legal protection and cooperation, proxies for cost- and
risk-sharing motives and a proxy for access to complementary knowledge.
The most important ¯nding of the two-step probit estimations8 is that the
probability of ¯rms cooperating in R&D is higher when incoming spillovers
are high and outgoing spillovers are low. Further, cost-sharing is found to
be an important motive for cooperation in R&D while risk-sharing is not.
Note that these results are based on data of ¯rms that are mainly vertically
related or cooperate with research institutes or universities. Only about 10%
of the ¯rms in the data are horizontally related competitors. This naturally
makes it di±cult to evaluate theory|which is mainly based on models of
horizontally related ¯rms|by their empirical results.
Kaiser (2002a) takes simultaneity issues into account by estimating in a
¯rst step an equation of cooperation choice and in a second step an equation
of innovation expenditures9. A distinction between vertical and horizontal
spillovers was directly derived from survey data. Further variables related to
the generality of R&D, research productivity, ¯rm size and sector dummies
are added to the cooperation choice equations.
Estimations indicate that horizontal spillovers seem to increase the prob-
ability to cooperate in R&D, while vertical spillovers are insigni¯cant. Also
research productivity, generality of R&D and ¯rm size increase the propen-
sity to cooperate. In the innovation equation, a positive impact of joint
research, horizontal spillovers and research productivity has been found, and
an inverse U-shaped impact of research generality.
Also in Belderbos et al. (2003) di®erent types of R&D agreements and
spillovers are considered. The decision to enter three types of R&D agree-
ments, i.e. horizontal, vertical and institutional, is jointly determined. Spill-
overs are subdivided into ¯rm-speci¯c horizontal and vertical spillovers and
industry-speci¯c outgoing spillovers. Next to control variables as R&D inten-
sity and ¯rm size, variables from the management literature that in°uence
8Two-step estimations were done to correct for possible endogeneity of the spillover
and permanent R&D variables.
9The author also models the decision of the type of partner to cooperate with, by
making a distinction between vertical cooperation and horizontal and mixed cooperation.
For results on this, we refer to the paper.
38the probability to cooperate in R&D, such as cost, risk and organizational
capability constraints and the rapidness of introduction of new products,
are added to the equation. Dummies for being part of a group, for being a
multinational ¯rm, for being part of the service sector and for receiving an
R&D subsidy are also included. As to mitigate problems of endogeneity, all
time-dependent right-hand-side variables are lagged by two years. Further-
more, similar estimations are done for a group of ¯rms that have been part
of a cooperative R&D agreement in 1998, but not in 1996, as to check the
robustness of the ¯ndings.
The ¯ndings regarding between-¯rm spillovers are that they are not sig-
ni¯cant in explaining horizontal cooperation, but vertical spillovers positively
in°uence vertical cooperation. Incoming spillovers from universities and re-
search institutions have a positive impact on all forms of cooperation.
In the study based on data of European ¯rms done by Hern¶ an et al. (2003)
the probability for business units to participate in cooperative R&D projects
is explained by variables that are similar to the ones in previous studies.
An important characteristic of their analysis is that they use a large control
group that is representative for the whole population of European ¯rms10.
Spillovers are measured on the industry level and are proxied by the average
number of months before the di®usion of an innovation in the industry11 and
the e®ectiveness of patents in the industry, both based on previous analyses.
Also R&D intensity at the industry level is included to control for possible
di®erences in potential cost reductions across industries. Other variables
that are included are the market concentration in the industry, ¯rm size, the
market share of the ¯rm, the cumulated number of past participations to
measure experience in R&D cooperation and country dummies. Problems
of endogeneity, are, as in Belderbos et al. (2003), dealt with by lagging all
time-dependent right-hand-side variables by two years.
A ¯rst important ¯nding is that, contrary to what has been found by Cas-
siman and Veugelers (2002), outgoing spillovers have a positive e®ect12 on
the probability that ¯rms cooperate in R&D. RJVs are also more likely in in-
dustries where technological knowledge di®uses rapidly, in more concentrated
industries, among large ¯rms and among ¯rms that have past experience with
participation in European cooperative projects. With respect to di®erences
between countries, the authors ¯nd that mainly ¯rms in smaller countries
participate in projects funded by the EU, according to them because ¯rms
10In Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and Kaiser (2002a) the samples only consist of ¯rms
that are expected to be innovative in a certain period.
11The authors classify this as a spillover variable, but the variable rather measures the
time lag before technological knowledge is actually di®used.
12E®ectiveness of patent protection has a negative sign.
39in large countries can easier ¯nd partners in their own country.
2.5 Conclusion
Empirical studies have recognised that knowledge spillovers between ¯rms in
the same industry and ¯rms in di®erent industries exist and are potentially
important. Whether they in°uence the decision to enter into cooperative
R&D agreements is less clear. In general, incoming spillovers are found to
increase the probability of R&D cooperation while the e®ects of outgoing
spillovers are ambiguous.
It is quite hard to ¯nd empirical regularities, which is not surprising
given the di®erences in data sets that underlay econometric estimations, in
estimation methods and in ways of de¯ning or computing proxies that should
represent variables found to be important in the theoretical literature on
R&D cooperation, such as e.g. (knowledge) spillovers. Moreover, results are
often industry-speci¯c. Still, some results seem to be more general than
others. First, R&D cooperation is more probable among larger ¯rms and
in more concentrated industries. Furthermore, evidence has been found for
cost-sharing motives being important for ¯rms when deciding to cooperate in
R&D. And ¯nally, especially general and basic R&D seem to be the subject
of cooperative agreements.
We conclude that empirical attempts to test or improve IO models of
R&D cooperation are still scarce which is probably due to a lack of ¯rm-
speci¯c data, or better, of adequate ¯rm-speci¯c data. In the ¯rst place,
R&D and related data are known to su®er from some speci¯c problems, such
as e.g. discontinuities in time series and ambiguous interpretations of R&D.
Furthermore, it is also di±cult to ¯nd or calculate empirical equivalents
for theoretical variables as e.g. spillovers and it is not clear whether these
capture the same features as in theoretical models. A complementary way
of investigating the relation between R&D cooperation and technological
spillovers would be to impose (some) features of theoretical models in the
laboratory and test in experiments whether speci¯c theoretical assumptions
or predictions are valid in such a simple, but real, environment.
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Laboratory research on R&D
and related games
3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of experiments that are
related to the non-cooperative or cooperative R&D models as examined in
chapter 1. In section 3.2 we overview the scarce literature on R&D exper-
iments that are mostly based on non-cooperative R&D games. The exper-
iments are either mere tests of theoretical predictions or they serve to gain
further inside on the R&D decision process. We have not found examples of
experiments on standard cooperative (process) R&D games as they exist in
the IO literature.
Cooperation has been studied in di®erent than R&D contexts, i.e. in the
context of pricing and quantity games (oligopoly games) and in the context of
public goods/bads games. Oligopoly games are related to the R&D models in
two ways. First, strategic interactions in R&D and in product markets have
similar characteristics, and second, the second stage of R&D models mostly
is a pricing or quantity decision stage. The link between R&D decisions and
decisions in public goods/bads games concerns externalities of actions. In
section 3.3 some of the most important conclusions that are based on these
related experiments are put together.
3.2 R&D experiments
In Isaac and Reynolds (1986, 1988) results of a static experiment on a stochas-
tic invention model where the probability of producing a practically relevant
innovation depends on the amount of R&D investment are reported. The
41R&D decision was operationalised by letting subjects choose a number of
draws with a constant cost. The underlying model is actually a single-period
model of a tournament type where the emergence of several winners is not ex-
cluded by the model or by assumption. If the race had several winners, they
simply shared the prize. As such, the underlying model is not one of (contin-
uous) timing. An experimental environment without perfect appropriability
was compared with a winner-take-all environment. Partial appropriability
was exogenously determined by the experimenters and was introduced by al-
lowing each subject to receive a positive pro¯t, as long as at least one of the
subjects innovated (as e.g. in Stewart, 1983). Another treatment variable
was market structure. Part of the experiments respectively contained four
and nine sellers.
The authors found strong support for most of the conclusions of tourna-
ment models (as in 1.2.1). First, they found that without spillovers, subjects
strongly overinvested in R&D compared to the cooperative or social opti-
mum. A second result is that an increase in the number of ¯rms reduced in-
dividual R&D investment but increased total industry investment. Finally,
experimental evidence also indicated that with spillovers R&D investment
was lower than without spillovers.
Hey and Reynolds (1991) and Zizzo (2002) are examples of experiments
on dynamic multi-stage patent races. The former experiment is based on the
deterministic patent race in Fudenberg et al. (1983), and the latter on the
stochastic patent race in Harris and Vickers (1987), but in both models ¯rms
go through a pre-speci¯ed number of steps before `winning an innovation'.
In Hey and Reynolds (1991) subjects simultaneously and independently had
to choose whether to invest nothing in R&D (going zero steps) or to invest
in R&D at a low (going one step) or high rate (going two steps), where
going two steps costs more than going two times one step. Both subjects
that reached the winning state at the same time shared the prize1. In Zizzo
(2002) ¯rms could choose to invest a number whereby the cost of investing
was calculated according to a quadratic cost function. The winner of each
round was randomly chosen with the probability of winning depending on
the rate of R&D investment.
Both experiments failed to provide evidence for the underlying models
that predict that if ¯rms are tied, they invest in R&D at a high rate and
that if they lag behind, they invest less or nothing at all. Zizzo (2002) did
¯nd evidence for the theoretical prediction that tied competitors invest more
the closer they are towards the end of the race. Since the Nash equilibrium
of their game might have been to complex to understand, Hey and Reynolds
1As such, the underlying model is not a `pure' tournament.
42(1991) performed a verbal protocol analysis in a later experiment as to have
a better idea on the decision processes of the subjects. Their main conclusion
still was that Nash equilibrium strategies were not always followed.
A somewhat di®erent approach is used in Sbriglia and Hey (1994) who
stress the complexity of an R&D decision problem rather than focusing on a
comparison of experimental behaviour with theoretical (Nash) predictions. In
their experiment subjects had to ¯nd an unknown combination of a number
of di®erent letters of the alphabet during an endogenous number of rounds,
each ¯xed in time. At the end of each round they could buy information at
a ¯xed cost on the amount of letters in their proposed trial combination that
were correct. High- and low-cost treatments were included and in part of
the treatments the information was noisy and to gain full information on the
amount of correct letters, additional costs were necessary. At the end of each
round subjects were also informed on the performance of their competitors.
Main results are that winners applied a successful search strategy and
generally invested more than losers. Losers used similar search strategies,
but invested not enough or were not lucky. Furthermore, competition result-
ing from joint discovery enhanced investment and decreased the number of
rounds before completion of the task2. In the noisy information treatments,
the number of incompetent and random players was higher than in the de-
terministic information treatments and experiments lasted more rounds.
Examples of dynamic experiments where subjects were to make R&D
and price/quantity decisions are Isaac and Reynolds (1992) and Jullien and
Ru±eux (2001). None of the two examples is based on a speci¯c theoret-
ical model. In Isaac and Reynolds (1992) a posted-o®er market has been
simulated by the computer. In the ¯rst ¯ve periods, subjects were only to
make price and maximum-selling-quantity decisions and beginning with pe-
riod 6, subjects could also make R&D decisions which resulted in lasting cost
reductions according to a stochastic invention mechanism (as in Isaac and
Reynolds, 1986, 1988).
The experimental results of four-sellers markets give support to behaviour
that the authors classify as Schumpeterian competition characterised by a
combination of engagement in costly innovation and falling prices and by
rising concentration. Market prices under monopoly, on the contrary, tent
to fall more slowly than under oligopoly. As such, the bene¯ts °ew more to
consumers under oligopoly than under monopoly. Oligopoly R&D investment
was generally lower than the social optimum, except in the last periods, but
2These results seem to correspond to some of the predictions of multi-stage patent
race models as tested in Hey and Reynolds (1991) and Zizzo (2002), but are based on
descriptive rather than statistical analyses.
43it is unclear whether it was close to an equilibrium prediction.
In Jullien and Ru±eux (2001) the market is characterised by a double
auction with human buyers. They introduced spillovers by letting R&D de-
cisions of a ¯rm yield industry-wide cost reductions with a time lag. Treat-
ments with deterministic innovation with certainty over the outcome of the
R&D investment and stochastic innovation, as in Isaac and Reynolds (1992),
were run.
Market prices generally converged towards their competitive level and
markets were thus e±cient. When all oligopolists simultaneously gained
a cost reduction that shifted the aggregate supply curve downwards (cfr.
spillovers), adjustment of market prices to their new competitive level in the
deterministic games was slower and bene¯ts of the innovations initially solely
accrued to producers. Furthermore, uncertainty caused more heterogeneity
in R&D decisions and yielded a categorisation of leaders, challengers and
followers. Leaders invested and kept investing, challengers tried to catch-up
the closer they were to the leader of the race and followers mainly stopped in-
vesting, which is consistent with predictions of some multi-stage patent race
models. Uncertainty also yielded prices that are further away from equilib-
rium predictions. Finally, only R&D decisions with uncertainty are reduced
by spillovers.
Finally, we consider two recent but unpublished experiments on the for-
mation and evolution of RJVs in a patent race framework (i.e. Silipo, 2001,
2003). The experiment in Silipo (2001) is based on a dynamic patent race
model with two ¯rms, developed in the same paper (see 1.4.1). In some
treatments subjects were assumed to collude in the ensuing product market
while in others they were assumed to compete, with collusion yielding higher
pro¯ts. Coinciding with theory, in the high-pro¯t (collusive) treatment more
RJVs were formed than in the low-pro¯t treatment. Also coinciding with
theory, with a large gap in knowledge between subjects at the beginning of
the race, RJVs were not formed. With a smaller gap, theory predicts that
they are not formed but in the experiment they were formed, and only in the
high-pro¯t treatment less frequently compared to the treatment without a
gap. Finally, experimental evidence also supports the theoretical prediction
that R&D e®ort with cooperation is lower than without cooperation.
The experiment in Silipo (2003) is less related to a speci¯c theoretical
model. In markets with four and seven producers, it has been investigated
how endogenous RJV formation and breaking down evolved in time. In a
dynamic patent race, subjects had to propose in each period with whom
to cooperate following an exclusive membership rule (as in 1.5.8) and how
much to invest in R&D. It turned out that winning a race was more probable
if being part of a wide R&D coalition. But only in four-player races there
44was industry-wide cooperation. Another result was that leaders with an
initial advantage started to cooperate among themselves, which was mostly
maintained in the four-player races. In seven-player races some evidence for
catching-up behaviour of followers was found. Finally, contrary to previous
results on two-player races, R&D investment seemed to be stimulated by the
possibility to form competing RJVs.
3.3 Related experiments
3.3.1 Oligopoly experiments
Many IO experiments have concentrated on identifying conditions under
which prices or quantities of oligopolists correspond to theoretical bench-
marks. As in a non-cooperative R&D game, these theoretical benchmarks
usually correspond to a non-cooperative or Nash equilibrium and a cooper-
ative level of prices or quantities where the cooperative option yields more
pro¯t than the non-cooperative option. An overview of oligopoly experiments
is given by Holt (1995).
A ¯rst general result is that in oligopolies with more than two ¯rms,
behaviour is usually not anti-competitive and Nash equilibrium predictions
often perform well. In duopoly experiments, on the other hand, there is a
larger probability that prices or quantities are above or below their predicted
equilibrium level. Tacit collusion3 has already been observed in duopoly
experiments, especially in multi-period experiments that consist of the rep-
etition of single-stage games (see also Davis and Holt, 1993; Keser, 2000).
Full e±ciency is not always obtained, though.
According to Holt (1995), tacit collusion is more probable in duopoly
experiments because a defecting ¯rm is identi¯ed and can be immediately
punished. Furthermore, in experiments with only two sellers, it is easier
to monitor the decisions of the other ¯rm. Experimental evidence for this
hypothesis has been found by Huck et al. (2004). In Cournot markets with
two ¯rms, some collusion came out, in markets with three ¯rms output was
often at the Nash level while four-¯rms markets were even more competitive.
Another factor which has extensively been examined is non-binding com-
munication. E®ects of communication on pricing behaviour in experiments
are not unambiguous though. Holt (1995) concludes that the e®ect depends
on the trading institution and the incentives to defect at the margin. With
posted prices and di®erentiated products, the e®ect is the largest. In Holt
3Tacit collusion refers to a situation where ¯rms collude in a market by setting high
prices or restricting quantity without having explicitly agreed on in a binding way.
45and Davis (1990) evidence is found that prices initially increase after price
announcements but that prices in the end return to their initial lower lev-
els. On the other hand, Harstad et al. (1998) ¯nd that the announcement
of prices leads to higher prices than the Nash equilibrium, though not as
high as the joint pro¯t maximization level. Cason (1995) comes to a simi-
lar conclusion but distinguishes e®ects of discrete and continuous signaling.
Continuous signaling, where it is optional to send a signal, stimulates coop-
eration more which could imply that the simple sending of a signal indicates
a willingness to cooperate. As such, communication may be important to
build trust among the sellers (see e.g. Muren and Pyddoke, 1999). Thus,
with an appropriate form of non-binding communication, tacit collusion may
arise in experimental markets.
Other factors that may enhance cooperative behaviour in duopolies are
symmetry in payo®s or costs (Mason et al., 1992; Keser, 2000) and the avail-
ability of information on the other ¯rm's pro¯t (Mason and Phillips, 1997).
In Cason (1994) and Cason and Mason (1999) information sharing is a deci-
sion variable in the experiments in that subjects have the possibility to share
information on demand and/or cost conditions before setting prices or choos-
ing output. They ¯nd that information is often shared, even in situations
where the scope for colluding is low, and that it may facilitate tacit collusion.
3.3.2 Public good/bad experiments
The non-cooperative R&D stage of an oligopoly model, given ¯rms' expec-
tations on prices or quantities in the second stage, is in a way related to a
public good/bad game. If spillovers in the non-cooperative R&D game are
complete, R&D decisions have positive externalities in the sense that pro¯t
of other ¯rms increases as a ¯rm raises its R&D investment. This mecha-
nism of positive externalities also works in a public goods game, through the
system of voluntary contribution.
The voluntary-contributions mechanism implies that each subject of a
group has to decide how much of his/her initial endowment to contribute to
the group4. After having made their decisions, the subjects receive|on top
of what remains from their initial endowment|a certain return as a percent-
age of total group contribution. Contributing nothing corresponds to the
Nash equilibrium and contributing everything to the cooperative optimum.
In these games actions of a player also increase pro¯ts of other players. The
opposite emerges without spillovers, as is the case in public bad games. In
4For overviews of public good experiments see e.g. Davis and Holt (1993), Ledyard
(1995) and Roth (1995).
46public bad games subjects are asked to take an amount from a group endow-
ment. Public good experiments typically yield higher levels of cooperation
than their public bad equivalents (Andreoni, 1995; O®erman, 1996; Willinger
and Ziegelmeyer, 1999; Park, 2000) which in this context is often referred to
as a framing e®ect.
It is generally found that in one-period games without repetition sub-
jects do not behave according to the Nash equilibrium but rather cooperate
to some degree, without reaching the Pareto-superior level. In experiments
with repetition, it is common that subjects' behaviour evolves from coop-
eration in some ¯rst periods to free-riding in later periods (see e.g. Isaac
and Walker, 1988; Ledyard, 1995; Andreoni, 1995). So, repetition leads to
reduced contributions to the public good.
Roughly three possible explanations for this observation exist in the liter-
ature (see e.g. Davis and Holt, 1993; Fischbacher et al., 2001). First, subjects
may learn to play the SPN equilibrium during the experiment which makes
initial cooperation a mistake. Second, cooperation may be a consequence of
strategic play and diminish or disappear when the other in a pair cheats.
Third, some of the subjects may be conditional cooperators and only coop-
erate if others cooperate.
Davis and Holt (1993) and Ledyard (1995) give an overview of other fac-
tors that have in°uenced individual contributions to the public good. Con-
trollable factors that increase contributions are e.g. the marginal per capita
return, common knowledge and symmetry with respect to payo®s. Factors
as economics training and experience with similar experiments also seem to
increase the probability of free-riding but are less easy to control.
Isaac and Walker (1988) and Isaac et al. (1994) have investigated e®ects of
group size in public good experiments and ¯nd that an increase in group size,
when coupled with a decrease in marginal return, leads to more free-riding5.
Finally, communication before the game is played, e.g. in the form of a
simple cheap talk treatment, signi¯cantly increases contribution rates and
consequently total group return. Beside this, repetition with communication
tends to increase contributions (Isaac et al., 1985; Isaac and Walkers, 1988;
Davis and Holt, 1993; Ledyard, 1995).
5That is when groups of 4 and 10 subjects are compared. Other conclusions are made
when comparing group sizes of 40 with 100, but are less relevant to us as oligopolies have
smaller group sizes.
473.4 Conclusion
Although the laboratory method would be an appropriate means of testing or
improving theoretical R&D models, complementary to the econometric and
other empirical methods, experimental economists have not paid attention to
it yet. On the basis of experiments that did serve as tests for non-cooperative
R&D models or that were aimed at gaining more insight in the complex
innovative decision process, we tried to ¯nd some general trends in results.
In simple static R&D experiments, Nash equilibrium predictions of R&D
decisions seem to perform well while in more di±cult dynamic experiments,
such as patent races and two-stage experiments with R&D and product mar-
ket decisions, theoretical predictions are less supported by experimental be-
haviour. As such, subjects seem not to be able to \calculate" Nash strategies
in more complex, dynamic environments. Recent experiments on RJV for-
mation in a dynamic patent race did provide partial support for theoretical
predictions, though.
However, in dynamic two-stage experiments with R&D and product mar-
ket decisions, the evolution of prices or quantities was the central issue and
less attention has been paid to comparisons of experimental R&D decisions
with theoretical predictions. These experiments ¯nd support for substantial
innovation. In general, whether R&D is either stochastic or deterministic,
prices are found to be close to the competitive level which makes the bene¯ts
of innovation accrue almost fully to consumers. When spillovers are taken
into account, such that all producers gain a cost reduction, in deterministic
R&D games it takes more time for prices to adjust to their competitive level.
Finally, we provided a short overview of the main conclusions and factors
that enhance cooperation in other oligopoly and public goods/bads exper-
iments given the similarities with non-cooperative R&D games. Factors as
number of ¯rms or subjects in the market or group, repetition, experience
and communication possibilities were found to be important in enhancing or
limiting cooperation.
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In this paper we have given an overview of theoretical, empirical and experi-
mental IO literature on the relation between R&D cooperation and spillovers.
While the topic is extensively documented in the theoretical literature, em-
pirical and especially experimental analyses are scarce.
The scarcity of empirical (econometric) analyses is probably due to a
lack of ¯rm-speci¯c data, or better of adequate ¯rm-speci¯c data. In the
¯rst place, R&D and related data are known to su®er from some speci¯c
problems, such as e.g. discontinuities in time series and ambiguous de¯nitions
on what R&D actually is. Furthermore, it is also di±cult to ¯nd or calculate
empirical equivalents for theoretical variables as e.g. spillovers and it is not
clear whether they capture the same features as in theoretical models. And
¯nally, the interrelatedness of R&D and other variables as market structure,
¯rm size, pro¯t etc., gives rise to econometric problems of simultaneity.
In the context of mainstream models of R&D cooperation and product
market competition overviewed in the ¯rst chapter, one could raise the ques-
tion whether ¯rms' actual R&D decisions correspond to the theoretical pre-
dictions. E.g. do ¯rms actually cooperate in R&D when they have possibil-
ities to commit to a binding agreement and is the Nash equilibrium a good
predictor of what ¯rms will do without binding contract possibilities? And
more importantly, are conclusions regarding R&D behaviour the same for
di®erent levels of spillovers?
An important research question, which has recently been given attention
by econometricians, is whether incentives to cooperate in R&D are di®er-
ent for di®erent levels of technological spillovers. Laboratory methods may
be an important way|complementary to existing econometric analyses|to
provide more clarity on this issue. We have pointed out in the ¯rst chap-
ter that for low levels of technological spillovers, R&D decisions are strategic
substitutes, and strategic complements for high spillover levels. These strate-
gic features can be nicely copied in the laboratory, which is not possible in
econometric analyses. Moreover, strategic interactions not only occur in an
R&D context. Other contexts where strategic interactions play an impor-
49tant role are the product market in IO models (Cournot versus Bertrand
competition) and adjustment of nominal prices after an anticipated money
shock6.
Further, an important factor that is mainly ignored in mainstream IO
models of R&D is the link between cooperation in R&D and cooperation
in the product market. It is mostly assumed|based on the assumption of
perfect functioning of anti-trust laws|that ¯rms compete in the product
market, irrespective of how they behave in the R&D stage. But would it
not be possible that cooperation in R&D `spills over' to cooperation in the
product market? If that is the case, welfare-enhancing e®ects of R&D coop-
eration are not that obvious any more. Given previous results of oligopoly
experiments, di®erent conclusions regarding the e®ect of R&D cooperation
on cooperation in the product market could arise between duopolies and
markets with more than two ¯rms.
Why experimental economists have been reluctant to investigate these
issues is not clear, given that laboratory methods have become a widely
accepted research methodology in industrial organisation. Especially as a
test for (assumptions of) simple theories, where strategic interactions are
important, laboratory methods are a useful and additional tool because (part
of) the simplifying conditions can be enforced in the lab. To summarise,
laboratory R&D experiments can be complementary to econometric research
and can serve as an important basis for the formulation of guidelines on how
to further improve theoretical models.
6Fehr and Tyran (2002) compares scenarios of strategic substitutes and strategic com-
plements in the context of adjustment of nominal prices after an anticipated money shock.
They ¯nd that with strategic complements prices adjust very slowly to the new equilib-
rium, while with strategic substitutes adjustment is very quick.
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